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Mark Schreiner
Abstract: Can scoring models help microlenders in poor countries as much as
they have helped credit-card lenders in rich countries? This paper presents a
scorecard that predicts the probability that loans from a microlender in Bolivia
will have arrears of 15 days or more. Although arrears in microfinance depend
on many factors difficult to include in scorecards, the paper shows that inexpensive, simple-to-collect data does have some predictive power. In microfinance, scoring will not replace loan officers, but it can flag high-risk cases and
act as a cross-check on loan officers’ judgment.

M

icrolenders make small, short, unsecured loans to the
self-employed poor. Few of these borrowers have standard collateral, credit-bureau records, or formal wage
jobs. Historically, lenders lacked low-cost ways to judge the risk of
lending to these borrowers. If lenders set interest rates to cover the
high per-dollar costs of small loans, then they were accused of
usury, but if they set lower rates, then they lost money.
Microfinance has been defined by new ways to cut the cost of
judging the credit risk of the self-employed poor. For example,
group lenders tap the knowledge of risk held as a sunk cost by
neighbors of a potential borrower. Likewise, individual lenders
control risk through detailed evaluations of the borrowers and their
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businesses, frequent repayments, stepped loan sizes, and chattel
collateral (Bond & Rai, 2002).
Scoring is new to microfinance, but it may help reduce the
costs of making loans to the self-employed poor. Scoring compares
simple-to-observe quantified data about the borrower, loan, and
lender with similar past cases. The share of similar past cases that
had repayment problems is an estimate of the risk that a current
case will also have repayment problems.
Credit-card lenders in rich countries make massive numbers of
small, short, unsecured loans each year at very low costs because
data-based scorecards inexpensively and accurately forecast the risk
of potential borrowers (Lewis, 1990). In high-income countries,
the microloan is often the credit card, and most home loans and
car loans are made based almost entirely on scoring. Of course,
microlenders also use a type of implicit, subjective “scoring” in that
they evaluate borrowers based on their own historical experiences and prejudices. Data-based scoring differs only in that it
is explicit and consistent (Longhofer, 2002). Most careful research
(Berger, Frame, & Miller, 2002; Frame, Padhi, & Woosely, 2001;
Martell, Panichelli, Strauch, & Taylor-Shoff, 1999) suggests that
scoring—combined with credit bureaux—has improved the depth
and breadth of formal loans in high-income countries. With better
knowledge of risk, lenders can approve more poor-but-safe borrowers and reject more non-poor-but-risky borrowers. In this way,
lenders save time that they would have spent dunning delinquent
borrowers and can use the newfound time to find new borrowers
(Schreiner, 2002). Can microlenders in poor countries also take
advantage of scoring?
Scoring can help microlenders to judge risk, but it is unlikely
to replace human loan officers anytime soon. For example, the
most important factors in credit-card scorecards—employment
and credit record—are often unavailable in low-income countries
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because credit bureaux are absent and potential borrowers are
self-employed.
This paper tests whether a simple scorecard can predict the risk
of costly arrears—spells of 15 days or more—for borrowers from a
microlender in Bolivia. The scorecard shows how characteristics are
linked with risk. In historical tests, the scorecard predicts better
than naïve models but worse than credit-card models. Thus, scoring
may help cut the costs of individual microloans (but probably not
group joint-liability loans; see Schreiner, 2002), not as a replacement for loan officers’ judgment, but rather as an additional filter
for high-risk cases that would otherwise slip by.
The next section gives the background for the scorecard. The
section after that reports how characteristics of the borrower,
the loan, and the lender are linked with arrears, and the section
following that tests the scorecard’s predictive power.

Scoring for a Bolivian Microlender
This section discusses the market for microfinance in Bolivia,
reviews past work on scoring for microfinance, and presents the
data and scorecard used in this paper.
Microfinance in Bolivia
Bolivia is microfinance’s showcase in Latin America. In spite of its
sparse population and deep poverty, microfinance has a high rate
of penetration. Most Latin American countries have, at most,
one microfinance lender with more than 10,000 borrowers; Bolivia
has a dozen such lenders. Several microlenders have converted
from unregulated not-for-profits to regulated for-profits. Most
borrowers are near the poverty line but are not among the poorest (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, & RodriguezMeza, 2000).
As recounted in Rhyne (2001) and Mosley (2003), profits in
microfinance attracted competition from Bolivian banks and
Chilean consumer-finance companies, and, by 1996, the market
started to saturate. Arrears skyrocketed, in part because the new
entrants tolerated high arrears and weakened the culture of
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repayment for all borrowers, and in part because microlenders, in
the battle for market share, made loans to people already indebted
elsewhere. The crisis in Brazil in 1999 also hurt repayment from
the women traders who make up the bulk of microfinance portfolios. As arrears rose to more than double their historical levels,
interest in scoring heightened as microlenders sought to find new
ways to control risk.
Past Work on Scoring for Microfinance
Many statistical models have linked arrears to characteristics of the
microlender, borrower, and loan (Nannyonga, 2000; Reinke, 1998;
Zeller, 1998; Sharma and Zeller, 1997). In broad terms, these
models have not been very useful as scorecards (nor were they
intended for this purpose) for three reasons. First, most models use
small samples and so may lack robustness. Second, some models
use characteristics that most microlenders do not already collect or
that are expensive to collect. Third and most importantly, these
models do not check predictive power. A historical test is needed
to confirm that the scorecard truly can predict risk and—just as
importantly—helps to convince loan officers and credit managers
that the scorecard works. Most past academic statistical models aim
to detect characteristics linked with risk, not to help lenders to
score potential borrowers.
Viganò (1993) is the best scorecard for microfinance in the
literature. It links default with 53 characteristics at a rural development bank in Burkina Faso. With a small sample (n = 100),
prediction was checked with the jack-knife (Efron & Tibshirani,
1993). Unfortunately, the small sample also required that the 53
characteristics be condensed into 13 factors, obscuring the links
between risk and specific characteristics. The scorecard also has
the technical drawbacks common to discriminant analysis
(Eisenbeis, 1981).
The scorecard in this paper is an improvement in three ways.
First, the sample is large (39,956 loans repaid in 1988 – 1996).
Second, the focus is less on the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients and more on the power to predict arrears for
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10,555 loans repaid in 1997. Statistical significance need not
imply predictive power (Hand, 1994). Third, the scorecard uses
only characteristics that most microlenders already collect.
Data and Scorecard
The Bolivian microlender makes loans to urban individuals in
trade and manufacturing. It bases risk evaluations almost exclusively on the personal judgment of loan officers; few loans are
collateralized, and a credit committee discusses only very large or
unusual loans. From August 1988 until the end of 1996, 1,987
loans out of 39,956 (5%) had costly arrears, defined as a spell of
15 days or more. Such long spells are costly to the lender because
they require extra collection efforts. In the first nine months of
1997, 8.6% of loans went “bad” (913 of 10,555 loans).
The following characteristics are known for all loans disbursed
and paid:
• Date of disbursement
• Amount disbursed
• Type of guarantee
• Branch
• Loan officer
• Gender of the borrower
• Sector of the firm
• Number of spells of arrears
• Length of the longest spell of arrears
This is an unusually short list; most scorecards for microlenders would also use the age, marital status, education, and length
of residence of the borrower; ownership of a phone, house, or car;
and measures of the size and financial strength of the household
and firm. Thus, the test in this paper is conservative: if a scorecard
with few characteristics works, then a scorecard with a full complement of characteristics on the borrower, loan, and lender would
work even better.
Scorecard construction uses knowledge of the characteristics of
past cases at the time of disbursement and of their subsequent
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repayment performance to infer future repayment risk for similar
current cases. Because data exist only for cases that were approved
under the lender’s standard evaluation process, the scorecard
applies only to current cases that also have been approved under
this process. Otherwise, sample-selection bias can degrade scorecard performance (Crook & Banasik, 2004).
The scorecard predicts “costly arrears,” defined as a dichotomous dependent variable that is 1 for “bad” loans with a spell of at
least 15 days and 0 for all other “good” loans. The scorecard is
derived from a logit model.
The characteristics linked with risk were chosen based on theory and experience. At the point that a loan has been provisionally
approved under the standard evaluation process, these characteristics can be taken as given. Of course, the terms of the loan
contract—such as the amount disbursed, the term to maturity,
and the guarantee requirements—do depend on the evaluation of
risk by the lender. For loans provisionally approved under the
lender’s standard evaluation, however, the loan terms are fixed.
Thus, the scorecard applies only to cases that, in the absence of
scoring, would have been approved.
The test below thus checks how well the scorecard flags highrisk cases that the loan officers and the credit committee nevertheless believed to be low-risk.

Links between Risk and Characteristics
Microlenders want to predict the risk of arrears, and they also want
to know which characteristics are linked with risk. This section discusses these linkages, and the next section discusses predictive
power.
The scorecard is derived from a logit regression based on
39,956 loans repaid by the end of 1996. The Χ 2 statistic for the
scorecard as a whole had a p value of 0.01, and 56 of 109 estimated
coefficients had p values of 0.10 or less.

70

Volume 6 Number 2

Scoring Arrears at a Microlender in Bolivia

Experience as a Borrower
The experience of the borrower is measured as the number of previous loans and also as the number of months since the first disbursement. Table 1 shows scorecard weights (derived from
estimated logit coefficients) that show how risk changes with the
borrower’s experience. Positive weights mark increased risk, and
negative weights mark decreased risk. Table 1 also shows p values
and the means of the characteristics.
Table 1. Scorecard weights for borrower experience
Mean

Weight

p value

0.460
0.247
0.131
0.070
0.039
0.022
0.013
0.008
0.005
0.006

0.000
–0.012
–0.023
–0.028
–0.032
–0.040
–0.034
–0.054
–0.026
–0.025

N/A
0.50
0.21
0.12
0.09
0.05
0.10
0.04
0.28
0.31

0.466
0.170
0.233
0.125
0.007

0.000
0.015
0.021
0.033
0.031

N/A
0.40
0.23
0.07
0.11

Experience of Borrower
Previous Loans
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 or more

Months since First Loan
0-6
7–19
20–53
54–147
148 or more

Number of previous loans
When we examine weights with p values below 0.10, we see
that the risk of a loan’s going bad decreases with the number of past
loans. For example, risk is 5.4 percentage points less for a borrower
with 7 previous loans than for a first-time borrower. All else constant, first-time borrowers (46% of cases) are the worst risks.
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Months since the first loan
Experience in months since the first loan is a different measure
than the number of previous loans because, for example, a borrower could get three one-month loans or three one-year loans.
Ranges of numbers of months are defined as a set of dummy variables (Table 1).
Although not all the weights have low p values, the broad pattern suggests that risk increases with time as a borrower. The effect
is large; a borrower whose first disbursement took place 54–147
months ago is 3.3 percentage points more likely to go bad than a
new borrower.
This may reflect regression to the mean. Borrowers tend to ask
for their first loan during uncommonly good times when their ability to repay is at a peak. If the first loan is repaid on time, then the
lender may encourage the borrower to take larger and longer loans,
even if the borrower is less able to repay such a loan than the first,
smaller, shorter loan.
In any case, this is a new result. While it is common wisdom
that risk decreases with more experience seen as numbers of loans,
no one has discussed that risk increases with experience seen as
months as a borrower.
Arrears in the Previous Loan
Experience with scoring for microfinance suggests that repayment
history is the best predictor of future repayment performance.
Most microlenders cannot check borrowers’ histories in credit
bureaux, but they use knowledge of past repayment performance
for their own repeat borrowers. Table 2 shows how risk is linked
with arrears in the previous loan. Spells of arrears were common,
but most were short.
Length of spells of arrears in days
The weights on arrears seen as the longest spell in days in the previous loan are large; compared with no arrears (67% of cases), cases
with one day of arrears had 2.4 percentage points less risk, and
cases with 31 or more days of arrears in the previous loan had 1.6
percentage points more risk in the current loan.
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Table 2. Scorecard weights for arrears in the previous loan
Mean

Weight

p value

0.674
0.127
0.054
0.034
0.028
0.012
0.009
0.016
0.007
0.004
0.014
0.009
0.003
0.007

0.000
–0.024
–0.018
–0.018
–0.013
–0.008
0.003
0.001
0.017
0.016
0.012
0.028
0.020
0.016

N/A
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.28
0.63
0.85
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.03

0.761
0.062
0.044
0.032
0.041
0.059

0.000
0.009
0.011
0.015
0.008
0.006

N/A
0.08
0.05
0.01
0.16
0.27

Arrears in Previous Loans
Longest Spell in Days
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10–14
15–23
24–30
31 or more

Number of Spells
0–1
2
3
4
5 or 6
7 or more

This result is new: for this microlender, repeat borrowers with
shorter spells in the previous loan were less likely to go bad than
those with no arrears in the previous loan. This is surprising;
common sense suggests that more past arrears would always mean
more risk. Why would a short spell be better than no spell?
Perhaps some arrears are due to random shocks, and perhaps
borrowers who have had some arrears but who worked to get back
on track in just a few days are, on average, less likely to have long
spells than those who have not yet fallen into arrears but who
might not be so robust once they do hit an unlucky stretch.
Number of spells
The number of spells of arrears in the previous loan is strongly
linked with risk (Table 2). Compared with 0 –1 spells, risk increases
for 2 – 4 spells and then starts to decrease. This may reflect traders
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who make frequent installments but who are often a day or two
late, not from negligence but because they wait to combine the trip
to pay the installment at the branch with other errands. For them,
the number of spells of arrears reveals little about the risk of long
spells of arrears.
Gender of the Borrower
Probably the best-known stylized fact in microfinance is that
women are safer bets for loans than men. The Bolivian lender made
most (58%) of its loans to women (Table 3). All else constant,
women were indeed less risky, but only by 0.2 percentage points
(the p value is 0.35, so the difference in risk between men and
women may very well be nil).
Does this disprove the stylized fact? Without controlling for
other factors, women are almost half as risky as men; the loans of
3.6% of women in the sample went bad versus 6.9% of loans to
men. But after controlling for other factors—many of them correlated with gender—most of the gender gap in risk vanishes. At least
for this lender, gender per se is not strongly linked with risk.
Rather, gender is associated with other factors that do cause
risk. For example, Bolivian women are more likely than Bolivian
men to be traders than manufacturers, and Bolivian women are more
likely to have smaller businesses and to take smaller, shorter loans.
So if the lender observes only gender, then gender is strongly
linked with risk, but if the lender observes many characteristics
and accounts for their linkages with risk, then gender is much
less predictive.
Sector
About 53% of loans went to traders, and their risk was 4 percentage
points less than manufacturers. This is a large weight; average risk
in the sample was 5%, so manufacturers were almost twice as risky
as traders. (More finely grained classes of sectors—for example,
agriculture and services as well as manufacture and trade—would
improve prediction, but the data for this lender lack this level
of detail.)
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Table 3. Scorecard weights for gender, sector, amount disbursed,
and guarantee
Mean

Weight

p value

Characteristic
Gender
Male
Female

0.422
0.578

0.000
–0.002

N/A
0.35

0.473
0.527

0.000
–0.040

N/A
0.01

0.006

0.005

0.52

Sector
Manufacturing
Trade

Changed Sector
Amount Distributed
Level
Increase
Decrease

676
140
25

0.0000023
–0.0000003
–0.0000123

0.03
0.89
0.01

0.029
0.475
0.248
0.248

0.000
0.002
–0.009
–0.004

N/A
0.55
0.01
0.29

0.100

0.001

0.76

Guarantee
Other
Personal
No Guarantee
Multiple

Changed Guarantee

Changing sectors between consecutive loans was associated with
0.5 percentage points more risk, but the p value is high, and few
borrowers switched sectors.
Amount Disbursed
The link between risk and the amount disbursed is weak. In 1998
dollars, each $100 disbursed was linked with an increase in risk of
0.02 percentage points (Table 3).
In terms of changes in amount disbursed between consecutive
loans, a $100 increase had virtually no link with risk, but a $100
decrease was associated with a decrease of 0.1 percentage points.
Apparently, this lender successfully rations borrowers suspected as
high risks.
In this case, the link between risk and the amount disbursed is
so weak that the microlender has little scope to affect arrears via
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changes in amount disbursed. The average loan is already small
($680), and the average increases ($140) and decreases ($25) are
even smaller. If the amount disbursed were reduced by $100, risk as
predicted by the scorecard would change by 0.8 percentage points.
In any case, the scorecard is properly used only after the microlender has provisionally approved the loan under its traditional
evaluation process and has set the terms and conditions of the
loan contract.
Guarantees
Of the four types of guarantees, the only one with a large effect and
a small p value is “no guarantee” (Table 3). Here, the lack of a
guarantee does not cause risk, but it does reveal risk as judged by
the loan officer. Most likely, only borrowers judged as very low risks
in the normal evaluation process had the privilege of borrowing
without a guarantee. Changes in the guarantee between consecutive loans are not linked with risk.
Branches
All branches are not equal (Table 4). Compared with “other” (the
central office and four small branches), the safest branch was associated with 1.3 percentage points less risk. The few borrowers who
switched branches were less risky by 0.8 percentage points. Such
results are useful to microlenders because branch performance is
susceptible to policy, for example through bonuses or training.
Loan Officers
This microlender bases its normal evaluation on the subjective
judgment of loan officers. Of course, officers differ in their ability
to “smell” high-risk cases, and they may also take time to learn the
ropes and to sharpen their “sixth sense.”
Perhaps surprisingly, risk increases as loan officers gain experience (Table 4). For example, cases handled by a new loan officer
with 0–6 months of experience are 3.2 percentage points less risky
than cases handled by an old hand with 148 months of experience.
Although loan officers learn to work smarter with time, the
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Table 4. Scorecard weights for the branch and the experience of
the loan officer
Mean

Weight

p value

0.438
0.114
0.072
0.161
0.044
0.053
0.078
0.040

0.000
–0.013
–0.012
–0.010
–0.008
–0.007
–0.003
0.000

N/A
0.23
0.12
0.13
0.29
0.51
0.56
0.98

0.024

–0.008

0.10

0.062
0.204
0.322
0.335
0.078

0.000
0.006
0.009
0.020
0.032

N/A
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.01

Characteristic
Branch
Other
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Changed Branch
Experience of Loan
Officer in Months
0–6
7–19
20–53
54–147
148 or more

amount of work that they must do also grows as their portfolios
expand. Furthermore, the quality of new borrowers may degrade
as loan officers get past the “cream” in the neighborhoods where they
work and start to recruit more “typical” borrowers.
Beyond experience, loan officers differ in their ability to sense
high-risk cases (Table 5). Compared with “other” officers (those
with less than 300 loans paid off ) the safest officer was linked with
4.8 percentage points less risk, and the riskiest officer was linked
with 2.1 percentage points more risk. Loan officers are not interchangeable parts; microfinance rests on personal relationships, so
who the person is is important. This matters because lender policy
influences loan officers more directly than borrowers.
The 12% of borrowers who changed loan officers—usually
because the loan officer quit—were 0.5 percentage points more
risky (Table 5). Thus, decreased staff turnover may lead to
decreased arrears.
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Table 5. Scorecard weights for specific loan officers
Mean

Weight

0.116
0.008
0.067
0.019
0.009
0.037
0.025
0.038
0.045
0.059
0.048
0.016
0.015
0.017
0.014
0.031
0.027
0.035
0.024
0.010
0.016
0.019
0.031
0.019
0.011
0.016
0.022
0.016
0.015
0.010
0.010
0.035
0.010
0.009
0.041
0.016
0.014
0.011
0.116

0.000
–0.048
–0.038
–0.037
–0.037
–0.033
–0.025
–0.024
–0.024
–0.023
–0.020
–0.019
–0.018
–0.017
–0.016
–0.015
–0.014
–0.013
–0.012
–0.007
–0.006
–0.005
–0.004
–0.002
–0.001
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.021
0.021
0.005

p value

Loan Officer
Other
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
Changed Officer

N/A
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.09
0.10
0.17
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.31
0.30
0.57
0.71
0.81
0.95
0.88
0.84
0.79
0.58
0.54
0.49
0.55
0.31
0.52
0.40
0.44
0.01
0.01
0.05

Scoring Arrears at a Microlender in Bolivia

Date of Disbursement
To control for seasonal or once-off changes in the market or
lender policy, the scorecard controls for the year and month of
disbursement. Loans disbursed in the months before Christmas
when business is heaviest are more risky (Table 6). Compared
with 1988–1991, risk increased in 1992–1993 before falling in
1994–1996.
In sum, risk depends on gender, sector, arrears in the previous
loan, the experience of the borrower, the experience of the loan
officer, the specific loan officer, and the specific branch.
Seasonality and changes in policy and in the market also matter.

Predictive Power
Scoring uses what is known from the past to forecast what will take
place in the future. This section checks how well the scorecard
Table 6. Scorecard weights for year and month of disbursement
Mean

Weight

p value

0.083
0.086
0.131
0.198
0.353
0.150

0.000
0.040
0.068
0.059
0.056
0.050

N/A
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

0.056
0.064
0.088
0.091
0.102
0.096
0.081
0.081
0.087
0.086
0.089
0.079

0.000
0.006
0.004
0.002
0.003
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.009
0.008
0.009
0.010

N/A
0.13
0.28
0.65
0.48
0.12
0.16
0.13
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.02

Characteristic
Year of Disbursement
1988–1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

Month of Disbursement
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

Volume 6 Number 2

79

Journal of Microfinance

built on data from 1988–1996 classifies loans repaid in the first
nine months of 1997.
By most measures, the scorecard does indeed have some predictive power. Still, it is less powerful than most scorecards for
credit cards. This reflects the challenge of microfinance to judge
risk without reference to credit bureaux or formal wage jobs. Risk
is correlated with inexpensive-to-observe characteristics, and lenders
can use this fact to reduce arrears, but the link is too weak for
scoring to replace loan officers completely.
In 1988–1996, 5% of the Bolivian microlender’s loans went
bad. In 1997, 8.6% went bad. A naïve model would predict that
5% of loans would go bad in 1997, but the scoring model predicted 6.4 %. Thus, about one-third of the increase in problematic
loans was due to changes in characteristics that appear in the scorecard, while two-thirds of the increase was due to other factors such
as changes in competition and in the macroeconomy.
Scoring also predicts the risk of each loan. For example, if the
Bolivian lender had used the scorecard in 1997 with a rejection
threshold of 0.10 (that is, if it had rejected all provisionally
approved applicants with a risk of 10% or higher, and approved all
others), then the share of bad loans would have decreased from
8.6% to 6.9%. With a threshold of 0.05, the share of bads would
have fallen to 4.8%.
As the threshold approaches zero, fewer bad loans sneak
through but more good loans are mistakenly rejected. Scoring gives
estimates of risk, but lenders must choose how to balance risk
against the cost to reduce risk and against other goals.
If estimated risk exceeds a threshold, then—for the purposes of
the historical test—a loan is rejected; otherwise, it is approved.
Given knowledge of what would have happened had the case
been approved (because, in reality, the cases in the historical test
were approved), scoring has four possible outcomes:
• “Good” approved: a “good” with predicted risk below the
threshold
• “Bad” rejected: a “bad” with predicted risk above the threshold
• “Bad” approved: a “bad” with predicted risk below the threshold
80
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• “Good” rejected: a “good” with predicted risk above the
threshold
For thresholds from 0–0.30 and for 1, the outcomes for the
historical test with 1997 data for the Bolivian lender are in Table 7.
In the test sample, 913 (8.6%) of loans were bads, and 9,642
(91.4%) were goods. As the threshold increases, goods approved
increase and goods rejected decrease; however, bads rejected
decrease, and bads approved increase. Lenders choose a threshold based on the trade-offs among the four outcomes, their goals,
and the benefits and costs of each outcome.
The all-bad threshold is so low (0.00) that all loans are
rejected. The all-good threshold is so high (1.00) that all loans
are approved. The all-bad model is a straw person, but the allgood model is not; it is equivalent to policy that the Bolivian
lender used once it had approved a borrower through its normal
evaluation when it did not have a scorecard.
Good/Bad Separation
The most basic test of a scorecard is how well it separates
goods from bads. The cumulative distributions of estimated risk
for goods and bads (Figure 1) show that the scorecard achieves
some separation. The distribution of goods (mean 0.062, median
0.042) is always left of the distribution of bads (mean 0.098,
median 0.077).
“Hit” Rates
To what extent does the scorecard separate goods from bads? The
proper measure of the sharpness of separation depends on the goals
of the lender (Hand, 1994; Kennedy, 1998). “Hit” rates are best if
a lender wants to optimize the share of goods approved and/or bads
rejected. Table 7 shows the share of goods approved, the share of
bads rejected, and the total hit rate (goods approved and bads
rejected as a share of all cases).
In terms of the share of goods approved, the all-good threshold
of 100% beats the scorecard at all possible thresholds. On the
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GA/(GA+GR)
BR/(BR+BA)
(GA+BR)/N

Share of Good Approved
Share of Bads Rejected
Total Hit Rate

0.00
1.00
0.09

0
0
9,642
913
0.55
0.71
0.57

5,343
267
4,299
646

0.05

0.81
0.37
0.77

7,791
578
1,851
335

0.10

0.93
0.19
0.87

8,976
740
666
173

0.15

0.97
0.11
0.89

9,330
815
312
98

0.20

Threshold

Note. There are 10,555 cases, 9,642 goods and 913 bads. The good rate is 0.914, and the bad rate is 0.086.

GA
BA
GR
BR

Formula

Goods Approved
Bads Approved
Goods Rejected
Bads Rejected

Measure

All bad
0.00

Table 7. Power to predict with historical data

0.98
0.06
0.90

9,491
861
151
52

0.25

0.99
0.03
0.91

9,561
886
81
27

0.30

1.00
0.00
0.91

9,642
913
0
0

All good
1.00

Scoring Arrears at a Microlender in Bolivia

other hand, the share of “bads” rejected for the scorecard beats the
all-good model at all possible thresholds.
An all-bad model would have approved none of the goods and
rejected all of the bads. Thus, the scorecard always does better than
Figure 1. Cumulative distributions of predicted risk for bads and
goods

the all-bad model in terms of goods approved but always does
worse in terms of bads rejected.
The total hit rate for the scorecard never beats the highest
naïve hit rate (0.914) that is achieved by simply predicting that all
cases will be good. If the Bolivian lender only wanted to maximize
the hit rate, then it would predict that all loans would be good.
In practice, however, the loss from a bad approved exceeds the
benefit from a good approved. Likewise, the cost avoided due to a
bad rejected exceeds the benefit missed due to a good rejected.
Because lenders do not weigh all outcomes the same, they generally
will do better with a scorecard than with their current (implicit)
naïve all-good threshold.
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Figure 2 shows the trade-off between the share of goods
approved and the share of bads rejected. The diagonal represents a
policy that rejects loans at random. Scoring has more power as its
curve bends away from the diagonal; a perfect scorecard would
trace the upper border and then the right border, forming an
upside-down reversed L.
The scorecard is near the upper border for shares of bads
rejected above 0.8 and near the right border for shares of goods
approved near 0.8. This suggests that the scorecard would work
well as a “super-pass” or “super-fail” filter. The lender could use the
scorecard to approve very low risks (super-passes) without further
ado and to flag high risks (super-fails) for more review.
In sum, the scorecard predicts risk well. It separates goods
from bads imperfectly (no scorecard is perfect), but, on average, it
assigns higher risk to bads than to goods. If the lender puts
more weight on successfully rejecting a bad than on successfully
approving a good, then scoring beats the all-good naïve model
Figure 2. Trade-off between the share of goods approved and
the share of bads rejected

84

Volume 6 Number 2

Scoring Arrears at a Microlender in Bolivia

currently used once a borrower is approved by the traditional
evaluation process.

Conclusion
Both credit-card lenders in high-income countries and
microfinance lenders in low-income countries make massive
numbers of small, short, unsecured loans. Unlike credit-card
lenders, however, microfinance lenders do not use scorecards.
Can scoring help microfinance? A scoring model for arrears at
a microlender in Bolivia suggests that it can. The model pinpoints
characteristics that are associated with risk and, more importantly,
it predicts risk better than the all-good naïve model currently used
by the lender in which all loans approved by the traditional evaluation process are disbursed. Still, scoring for microfinance is less
powerful than scoring for credit cards, so scoring and knowledge of
quantitative characteristics will not replace loan officers and their
knowledge of qualitative character anytime soon.
How should scoring be used? As usual, the math is the easy
part. The difficult work is to collect the data and then to use the
risk forecasts. The scorecard here is not powerful enough to accept
or to reject applicants without a standard evaluation; risk is linked
with the characteristics in the scorecard, but it still depends
strongly on factors that only the loan officer can observe. Also, the
scorecard starts from the premise that an applicant has already
been provisionally approved under the normal evaluation.
The scorecard is probably most appropriately used as a superfail filter that flags high-risk cases that deserve more careful review.
Thus, scoring channels effort to borderline cases where rewards
are greatest.
Even lenders who do not score each borrower can still use
knowledge of the weights in scorecards to inform policy choices.
For example, the Bolivian lender might try to attract more traders
because they are safer than manufacturers. Likewise, the lender
might refer to a special credit committee all loans to borrowers who
had a spell of arrears in their most recent loan of more than 15 days.
Finally, the scorecard isolates the risk associated with individual
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branches and individual loan officers. This allows the lender to
target training and incentives to those who need it the most.
In the end, the greatest challenge to scoring for microfinance
is not technical but managerial. After all, predictive power can be
tested with historical data, so no microlender should have to use a
scorecard that does not forecast risk well. But some microlenders—
especially those whose mission focuses more on service to the
poorest than on profitability—fear that scoring will overstate the risk
of the poor and fear that knowing the risk of the poor will lead to
mission drift.
Both fears are valid, and both may be addressed with proper
management. Scoring will not overstate the risk of the poor as long
as scorecards are based on historical data for loans commonly used
by the poor. For example, suppose that a poor person applies for a
microloan and is run through two scorecards, one constructed
from data for mortgage loans to middle-class, salaried civil servants
and one constructed from data for microloans for poor people.
The civil-servant scorecard will likely overstate the risk of the
self-employed poor (because they will appear to be very belowaverage civil servants), but the microloan scorecard will, on average,
give an accurate estimate of the risk of the poor. Thus, the key to
avoiding shortchanging the poor is not to blindly apply scorecards
constructed with data from one type of loan and one type of population to a different product and population.
But what if the data show that the poor are indeed worse risks,
even for loans tailored to their demands? This knowledge need not
automatically lead to mission drift; what kind of mission-driven
organization would abandon its mission just because it learns that
success is more difficult than expected? No, knowledge is better
than ignorance. If the poor are riskier, then managers can use that
knowledge to make better decisions about how to make trade-offs
between cost and depth of outreach. Even the most mission-driven
poverty lender has a limit; a loan made to one poor person with an
80% risk of default is a loan not made to another less-risky poor
person (or, through time, several loans not made to other lessrisky poor people). So while poverty-focused lenders are willing to
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accept more risk, they (and their borrowers) benefit from greater
knowledge of risk. After all, arrears harm borrowers at least as
much as lenders, as borrowers suffer worry and humiliation and may
end up selling assets to repay debts (Mosley, 2001). Scoring gives
managers better knowledge of repayment risk; whether managers use
that knowledge for good or ill is up to them. The best way to
improve the odds of good use is not to suppress scoring but to educate managers about what scoring can and cannot do and when
scoring is appropriate.

Note
I am grateful for support from the anonymous microfinance lender in Bolivia and
for funding from the Division of Asset Building and Community Development of the
Ford Foundation. I am also thankful for comments from the anonymous referees
and from John Adams, Jonathan Conning, Guillermo Rabiela, Loïc Sadoulet, Laura
Viganò, and participants in the Third Annual Seminar on New Development Finance.
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